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COMPLETE LOGIC PROGRAMS WITH 
DOMAIN-CLOSURE AXIOM 
PAOLO MANCARELLA, SIMONE MARTINI, AND DIN0 PEDRESCIII 
D Complete logic programs augmented with the domain-closure axiom are 
proposed as the reference theory for logic programming with negation as 
failure. An inference rule corresponding to “proof by case analysis” is 
proved correct within this framework. As a major consequence, the com- 
pleteness results for SLD resolution and negation as failure still hold. An 
interesting outcome is that some novel operational properties of SLD - 
resolution can be proved. a 
INTRODUCI’ION 
The negation-as-failure rule was introduced to deal with negative information in 
logic programmin g [l]. Since a Horn definite logic program has no negative logical 
consequence, it was necessary to devise a suitable reference theory in order to assign 
negation-as-failure a declarative, model-theoretic meaning which justifies its use. 
Thus the notion of completion of a logic program, or complete logic program, was 
introduced, which consists of a simple transformation of a logic program P. 
Roughly speaking, it is a pair (P *, U *) where P * is the theory obtained essentially 
by replacing the clauses defining each predicate p in P with a single axiom, in 
which the if connectives appearing in the original clauses are replaced by a single zy 
connective. Since this task requires the use of an equality predicate = , not 
appeasing in P, P* is equipped with the theory U * defining the equality theory 
induced by unification. A complete logic program shares the same positive logical 
consequences of the corresponding definite program, but it is richer as far as 
negative information is concerned. Soundness [l] and completeness [2,14] of nega- 
tion as failure with respect to (P *, U *) have been proved. More precisely, these 
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results can be summarized as follows: given a possibly open literal p(t), V,p(g) is 
a logical consequence of (P *, U *) iff the proof of p(l) finitely fails under fair SLD 
resolution (_t stands for a tuple of terms). In [3] the classical results concerning 
complete programs are made parametric with respect to the equality theory E *, i.e., 
they are extended to generalized logic-programming systems where standard unifica- 
tion, corresponding to syntactic equality, is replaced by some kind of generalized 
unification, corresponding to some suitable, problem-oriented equality theory E *. 
Relying on the results and proof techniques in [3], the main contribution of our 
work is to show that the classical results for complete logic programs with standard 
unification can be extended to refer to complete programs equipped with a stronger 
equality theory, still modeling unification. Such a theory, denoted U&-, is obtained 
by adding to Clark’s equality theory U * an extra axiom, referred to in the literature 
as the domain-closure axiom (DCA) [7,8]. Informally, the effect of this new axiom is 
to enforce any model of (P *, U&_,) to have an interpretation domain in which each 
object must be constructed using the (interpretations of) constant and function 
symbols. Thus iJ&, interpretations are more closely linked to Herbrand interpreta- 
tions than usual U *-interpretations. ’ In particular, we will show that (P *, U&,) 
and (P *, U *) share the same ground (positive and negative) logical consequences, 
that is, for each ground atom A, (P*,U&,)!=A iff (P*,U*)!==A as well as 
(P *, U&,) I= -A iff (P *, U * ) k -,A. Moreover, the equivalence with respect to 
negative consequences i pervasive up to universally quantified negative theorems, in 
the sense that given a (possibly open) atom p(g), (P *, U&,) k V,p( f ) iff 
(P *, U *) k V,p(_t). On the other hand, (P *, U&_,) has universally quantified 
positive consequences that (P *, U *) has not, even though they can be precisely 
characterized in terms of the consequences of (P *, U * ). 
As a consequence, stronger completeness results for both SLD resolution and 
negation as failure can be stated and proved with reference to (P *, U&-,). Further- 
more, we are in the position of claiming that U&- is the strongest theory for 
syntactic unification (extending Clark’s theory) within which completeness can be 
still obtained. This is due to a recent result by Michael Maher, who showed that 
U$&, is a complete theory, in the classical sense that it decides every formula [ 121. 
Even if this result seems interesting per se, it has also a number of implication 
from an operational viewpoint. The reason for this is that (P *, U&-,) is char- 
acterized by an inference rule related to the notion of term couering. A covering of a 
term t is a (possibly infinite) set of terms {t,, . . . , t,, . . . } such that any ground 
instance of t is also a ground instance of ti for some i. For example, referring to the 
constant a and the unary function f, {a, f(x)} is a covering of the variable term y. 
We will show in Section 3 that the following inference rule is correct for (P *, Cl&,): 
Let +I,] be a wff with variable x free, and let { t,, . . . , t,} be a jinite covering of the 
term t. 
If for each i V+,,, is a logical consequence of (P *, lJ,*,,) 
then V+,,, is a logical consequence of (P *, U&,). 
‘Indeed, U& acts as a first-order (and hence noncategorical) approximation of the so-called 
closed-domain assumption (see for instance [13]), which actually consists in considering only Herbrand 
model. DCA coincides with the closed-domain assumption in the case of database-like programs where 
no function symbol occurs. 
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This is what we mean by the sentence “the logical consequences of (P *, I&,) 
are closed under finite coverings”. The above inference rule can be consistently 
understood as proof by case analysis, in the sense that proving a statement for an 
exhaustive, finite set of subcases (corresponding to a finite covering) is sufficient to 
prove the statement in full generality. If compared with induction, the above rule is 
obviously weaker, in the sense that any statement deducible using the proof-by- 
case-analysis rule can be deduced using induction, but not vice versa. 
The mentioned results allow us to exploit this inference rule to prove some novel 
operational properties of SLD resolution. Firstly, a notion of completeness of SLD 
resolution with respect o proof by case analysis is obtained, namely, if Vp(g)fl is a 
theorem of (P *, U&), then there exists a finite set of SLD derivations starting 
from p(r) which yields a finite covering of _t. Secondly, a sort of lifting property for 
negation as failure is proved, that is, the finite failure of p( t,) for each element of a 
finite covering of a term t guarantees the finite failure of p(t) itself. We believe it is 
interesting that a number of novel operational features of logic programming can be 
obtained relying on pure model-theoretic arguments. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 sets up some preliminary definitions 
and terminology. In Section 2 the equality theory and the domain-closure axiom are 
defined, and a characterization of their models is given. Section 3 introduces 
coverings and the closure-under-coverings property of (P *, U&.,). Section 4 is 
devoted to the main results about relationships between (P *, U *) and (P *, U&,), 
and finally, Section 5 exploits these results to devise some novel operational 
properties. 
1. PRELIMINARIES 
Here and throughout he paper we will use underlined symbols to denote tuples of 
objects. For example x x. 7 _,__I,*-* will stand for tuples of variables, and {, _ti,. . will 
stand for tuples of terms. 
We refer to [3] and [4] for terminology and notation concerning logic programs 
with equality and generalized unification. There, a logic program is a pair (P, E) 
where P is a set of definite Horn clauses and E is a definite-clause quality theory. 
Unification is then defined with respect o theory E and is referred to as generalized 
unification. An E-unifier for two terms s and t is a substitution 8 such that 
E k= s6 = to. Using the fact that E is a definite-clause quality theory, it can be 
shown that E induces over the Herbrand universe HU a finest congruence (=), and 
thus HU/= can be considered as the intended domain of interpretation. The 
notions of Herbrand base and Herbrand interpretations can then be easily gener- 
alized to those of E-base and E-interpretations. Similarly, the fixpoint semantics of 
generalized logic programs is given by defining a continuous map qp, E) between 
E-interpretations. 
Appropriate generalizations of the notions of derivation sequence, success set, 
and finite failure set can also be given for generalized logic programs. A (P, E)-deri- 
uation sequence (as well as a fair (P, E)-derivation sequence) is defined in the same 
way P-derivation sequences are for standard logic programs, where the notion of 
standard unification has to be replaced with E-unification. As usual, a (P, E)-der- 
ivation sequence can be successful, finitely failed, or infinite. Analogously, the 
success and finite-failure sets for a given logic program (P, E) are defined as 
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follows: 
SS(P,E)={A(A is a ground atom and there exists a successful (P, E)-deriva- 
tion sequence of A }, 
FF( P, E) = {A 1 A is a ground atom and for any fair selection rule there exists a 
number n such that all (P, E)-derivation sequences of A are finitely 
failed with length 2 n }, 
GF( P, E) = {A ( A is a ground atom and for any fair selection rule all (P, E)- 
derivation sequences of A are finitely failed (their length is un- 
bounded)}, 
GGF( P, E) = {A ) A is a ground atom and for any fair selection rule all ground 
(P, E)-derivation sequences of A are finitely failed}. 
Note that A E GGF( P, E) \ FF( P, E) means that A has an infinite (fair) deriva- 
tion sequence but all its ground derivations are tinitely failed. We will write simply 
SS(P),FF(P),... in the case of standard logic programs. 
When negation as failure is used to obtain negative information from a standard 
logic program, it is well known [1,9] that complete logic programs are needed in 
order to give negation as failure a declarative meaning. Indeed, the use of the very 
same rule in the framework of generalized logic programs with equality requires a 
suitable generalization of the notion of complete programs. This is achieved in [3] by 
defining the completion (P *, E * ) of a logic program (P, E), where P * is an 
augmented e$nite-clause program obtained from P using essentially Clark’s trans- 
formation, whereas E* is a unijkation complete quality theory2 extending E. AS 
an instance, Clark’s theory U * for equality is a unification complete extension of 
the equality theory consisting only of the usual equality axioms. The following 
proposition states the soundness and completeness of successful (failed) (P, E)-de- 
rivations for positive (negative) ground atoms valid in (P *, E * ). 
Proposition 1. 
(i) (P*,E*)kA@AESS(P,E). 
(ii) (P*,E*)l=7AifAEGF(P,E). 
As one would expect, these results mirror the corresponding ones for standard 
logic programs, although the finite failure set FF should be replaced here by the 
general finite failure set GF. Indeed, when the theory E is such that for all pairs of 
terms s and t there exists a finite set of maximally general E-unifiers, then 
FF( P, E) = GF( P, E). This is obviously true when E-unification is just standard 
unification, which will be always the case throughout this paper. 
2. EQUALITY THEORY AND DOMAIN-CLOSURE AXIOM 
From now on, we will refer to logic programs defined over a first-order language 
providing a set Z of function symbols (constants are just 0-adic functions) and a set 
II of nonlogical predicate symbols not containing “ = “. Let U * be the following 
2An equality theory E * is unijhzrion complete if for every equation s = 1, E* k ((s = t) - V,B,), 
where { 0, } is the (possibly empty or infinite) set of E *-unifiers of s and t, looked upon as a set of 
equations. Whenever this set is empty, the disjunction is assumed to be false. 
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unification complete equality theory: 
(= 1) VX(X = X). 
(=2) Vxytw((x=yAz=w)+(x=z-+y=w)). 
(=3) vx I,.-.,Xn,Yl,...,Y,(x,=Yl,...,Xn=Yn * f(xl,...,X,)=f(Yl,...,Y,)) 
for each n-ary function f E Z, n 2 0. 
(=4) vx 1, . . . , x,, yl, . . . , y,J f( x1, . . . , x,) # g( yl, . . . , y,)) for each pair of func- 
tionsf,gE& f#g. 
( = 5) Vx( t z x) for each nonvariable term t such that x occurs in t. 
Axioms (=1),...,(=5) are actually the equality theory underlying unification, 
introduced in [l]. (= 1) is the axiom for reflexivity of = , while (= 2) is the axiom 
for both symmetry and transitivity. (= 3) ensures that each function symbol must be 
interpreted as a function (if part) and also that this function must be injective (only 
if part). (= 4) ensures that objects constructed using different leftmost constructors 
are different, that is, each function (respectively, constant) symbol has to be 
interpreted as a distinct function (object). (= 5) states that if t is a subterm of t’, 
then t and t’ must be mapped into different objects: This corresponds to the 
so-called occur check in the unification algorithm. 
Let now U&* be U* extended with the following axiom: 
(DCA) Vx v 3y,,...,y,(x=f(y,,...,y,))v v 
/ is a function c is a constant 
This last axiom is referred to in [7,8] as the domain-c2osure axiom. It forces the 
interpretation domain of a model to contain only objects which can be constructed 
(even if not effectively) using the (interpretation of) constant and function symbols. 
REMARK. u* no,,,-unification is nothing but standard unification, and thus U&, is 
unification complete. 
It was argued in the introduction that U * ,,-interpretations are more closely 
linked to Herbrand interpretations than to U *-interpretations. This is motivated by 
the following theorem, where we use ]M] for the domain of a model M, HU, for the 
Herbrand universe over B and [flw for the interpretation in M of the symbol f. 
Theorem 1. Let M I= U&,. Then 
(a) ]M] contains an isomorphic copy H of the Herbrand universe HU,. 
(b) ~~I~I~~~;9~=[fl~(~~,...,~m)f or some function f in 2, m 2 1, and at 
least one d, E (M( \ H. 
PROOF. (a): H is inductively constructed as the least subset of (MI which satisfies: 
(i) [ clM E H for each constant symbol c of Z; 
(ii) [.0,&k..., d,) E H for each function symbol f of 2 if d,, . . . , d, E H. 
H is clearly isomorphic to HU, by axioms (= 3), (= 4), and (= 5). 
(b): Given d E IMI \ H, first of all notice that for each constant symbol c of Z, 
d#[c],. Hence, d=[f],(d, ,..., d,) for some function symbol f of Z, by (DCA). 
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Suppose that {d,, . . . , d,} c H: then, by construction, d E H, contradicting the 
hypothesis d E jM\ \ H. Conversely, U * ensures that each object in H is con- 
structed in a unique way from (interpretation of) constants and functions. Hence, if 
d=Lfl,(d,,..., d,) with dj E [MI \ H, d cannot belong to H. 0 
In other words, by Theorem 1 we have that if M k U&, then for each d E (M( 
there exists a nonvariable term t over Z and a variable assignment V such that 
d= th,v- Notice that (a) holds also for U *. 
As an example, let ZNat contain the constant 0 and the unary function s; thus, 
the corresponding equality theory U&, is 
(= 1) Vx(x=x). 
(=2) Vxyzw((x=yAz=w)-+(x=z+y=w)). 
(= 3) Vxz(x = z 4+ s(x) = s(z)). 
(= 4) Vx(s(x) z 0). 
(= 5) Vx(s”(x) # x), n 2 1. 
(DCA) Vx(x = 0 v 3z.x = s(z)). 
The Herbrand universe, consisting of w (the set of natural numbers) with the 
obvious interpretation for 0 and s, is of course a model of both U * and U&.,. On 
the other hand, ou {s”(-)}~~~, with . distinct from any natural number, is a 
model of U* but not of U&A, since - is not constructed via s from any other 
object. Consider instead the interpretation M consisting of the disjoint union o + Z, 
where Z is the set of (positive and negative) integers (disjoint union avoids 
confusion between naturals and nonnegative integers). Moreover, define an ap- 
propriate successor function Succ on u + Z, which yields either the natural or 
integer successor depending on the argument. By defining [0] M = 0 E N and [s],+, = 
Succ, M is a model of U$*,,. Notice that in this case it is impossible to effectively 
denote an object in Z by means of a ground term of the language, even if an open 
term like s(x) has objects in Z as M-instances. Finally, notice that this model 
satisfies DCA, since also for each m E Z there exists an object z (E Z) such that 
m = [sl&z). 
3. COVERINGS 
This section introduces rerm cooerings, the crucial notion used in the sequel to relate 
the various results of this paper to each other. 
Following [6], let ground(t) denote the set of ground instances of a term t. If t’ is 
an instance of t (written t’ 5 t), i.e. there exists a substitution 19 such that tt9 = t’, 
then ground(t’) c ground(r). We say that t and t’ are equivalent (written t - t’) if 
t’ I t and t I t’. A substitution y = {xi --, y,, . . . , x, --, y,,] is a permutation of 
uariables if the y,‘s are distinct variables and {xi,. . . , x, } = { y,, . . . , y, }. The term t 
is a variant of t’ if there exists a permutation of variables y such that ty = t’. If the 
Herbrand universe is not trivial (i.e. it is neither empty nor a singleton), then t - t’ 
ifI gronnd( t) = ground( t’) iff t is a variant of t’. Finally, t’ is a proper instance of t 
(written t’ < t) if t’ < t but t’ is not a variant of t. Clearly, t’ < t implies 
ground( t’) c ground(t). 
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Let t be a term, and t a (possibly infinite) set of terms. Then .$ is a cooering of t 
iff for each Herbrand ground instance g I t there exists t’ E 5 such that g 5 t’. 
Moreover, ,$ is an exact cooering of t iff 5 is a covering of t and for each t’ E E, 
t’ I t. Hence if 5 is a covering of t, then ground(t) c UtrEE ground(t’), and if 5 is an 
exact covering of t, then U ,, E t ground( t’) = ground(t). A covering for the variable 
term x is called a domain couering. It should be stressed that: 
(1) if 5 is an (exact) covering of t, then 5 is an (exact) covering of any variant u 
of t; 
(2) if 5 is an (exact) covering of t, then 5’, obtained from 6 by replacing some 
term t’ E 5 with a variant u’ of t’, is an (exact) covering of t. 
The notion of (proper) instance and (exact) covering can be naturally extended to 
n-tuples (ti, . . . , t,) of terms. 
REMARK. The notion of term covering, as well as the results relying on it, makes 
sense only if the Herbrand universe is nonempty, as they refer to the existence of 
ground terms. Thus, in what follows, it is assumed that the Herbrand universe is 
nonempty. 
A few examples are the following. Referring to ZNat introduced in Section 2, 
{x>, (0, S(X))> (0, s(O), ~(~(X))} are all domain coverings. The set {s(O), s(s(x))} is 
an exact covering of the term s(x), and it is a (nonexact) covering of any term 
t IS(S(X)). The set ((0, s(O)),(s(x), s(s(x)))} is a covering of the pair of terms 
(x, s(x)). Referring to a signature Z providing the constant a and the binary 
function f, the set { f( a% a), f(f(% v), f(r, w))} is a covering of the term f(x, x), 
and of course it is not a domain covering. The set {( f( a, a), x), (f( f(x, v), 
f( u, w)), z)} is a covering of the pair of terms (f(x, x), x). 
The following proposition points out a relation between coverings and models of 
U,&,, namely that finite domain coverings actually couer the domain of any model 
of U&. 
Proposition 2. Given B and the corresponding equality theory U&-, let A4 I= U$&, 
and 5 be a jinite domain covering. Then for each d E IMJ there exists a term t E [ 
and a variable assignment V such that d = [t lM, “. 
PROOF. The proof is immediate if the Herbrand universe HU, is finite (i.e. X 
provides only constant symbols), since in this case the interpretation domain of each 
model of U,& is forced to be isomorphic to HU,. 
In the remainder of the proof, the notions of depth of a subterm within a term 
and of length of a term are used. The former is defined as the greatest level of 
occurrence of a subterm within a term, with respect o the ordinary parse tree of the 
term. The length of a term is defined as follows: 
length( t ) = 1 if t is a variable or a constant, 
length( f( t,, . . . , t,)) = 1 + max{ length( ti)} if f is a function. 
If HU, is infinite, take an arbitrary M k U&-, such that 1MI is not isomorphic 
to HI& Take an arbitrary d E IMI. by Theorem l(a) lM1 contains an isomorphic 
copy H of HU,: If d E H, the proof is immediate. Otherwise, if d E IMI \ H, by 
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Theorem l(b) d=[f],(d,,..., d,) for some function symbol f and at least one 
dj E )A41 \ H. Thus, it is possible to construct an open term u1 of the kind 
f(t 1,. . , t,) where ti is a new variable xi if di E IMJ \ H, and ti is the ground 
Herbrand term corresponding to di if di E H. Clearly, d = [ uJM, vl for some 
variable assignment V,. Hence, repeated applications of Theorem l(b) allow one to 
construct a term u,, with d = [u,] M, V, for some assignment I’,, such that the depth 
of each variable in u, is greater than the length of each term in 4. Replace the 
variables in u, by constants to obtain a ground term s. Some term in .$ must cover 
s, and so it must also cover u,. 0 
It is worth noting that the above proposition no longer holds if one drops the 
condition that 5 is finite. As an example, consider the (infinite) domain covering 
(0, s(O), s(s(O)), .. .} with respect o XNat: clearly, it does not cover any domain of a 
model of U&, which is not isomorphic to HUTNa,. 
Proposition 2 justifies the introduction of an Inference rule for theories equipped 
with U&, which can be consistently understood as proof by case analysis. In fact 
Proposition 2 ensures that, exploiting the domain-closure axiom, a finite covering of 
a term r is representative for all the possible instances of t over any interpretation 
domain. Hence proving a statement for an exhaustive, finite set of subcases 
(corresponding to a finite covering) is sufficient to prove the statement in full 
generality. The following theorem formalizes the above rule in the case of complete 
logic programs under U&-,. 
Theorem 2. Let P be a definite program, and +[x,,.,.,xnl be a formula, over the same 
language as P, whose free variables are x1,. . . , x,. Let 5 be a finite covering of the 
n-tuple of terms (tl,. . . , t,). Then 
(P *, U&,) != t/cp[,; ,_,_, tAl for each n-tuple (t;, . . . , $) E t 
if (P*,u~,)~v~~,,...,,“~. 
PROOF. Trivial, since from Proposition 2 (extended in a straightforward way to 
n-tuples of terms) one obtains that, given an arbitrary model M of (P *, U,&), any 
M-instance of (t,, . . . , t,) can be obtained as a M-instance of some n-tuple 
(ti,..., t;)E& cl 
As an example, if P is 
PW&- 
P(O):- 
then, since p(0) and Vxp(s(x)) are both logical consequences of (P *, U&,) and 
(0, s(x)} is a covering of the term x, Vxp(x) is also a logical consequence of 
(P *, .?I&-,). It is worth noting that Vxp(x) is not a logical consequence of 
(P*, u*). 
In the rest of the paper we will exploit these properties in order to characterize 
the relationships between (P *, U&,) and (P *, U * ), as well as to derive some 
useful properties of SLD resolution. 
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4. COMPLETE LOGIC PROGRAMS AND ZJ,*, 
In this section, the results summarized in Proposition 1 are rephrased when 
(P *, U * ) is replaced with (P *, U&). Furthermore, exploiting the proof tech- 
niques used in [3] and the notions introduced in the previous section, stronger 
completeness results will be provided for both SLD resolution and negation as 
failure. 
First of all, by observing that U&,- unification is nothing but standard unifica- 
tion and that GF(P, E) = FF(P, E) as far as E-unification is standard unification, 
Proposition 1 has the following 
Corollary I. 
(i) (P*,I!J&,)I=A iffAESS(P). 
(ii) (P*, U&) t= ,A @A E FF(P). 
Corollary 1 ensures that (P *, U *) and (P *, U&,) share the same (positive and 
negative) ground logical consequences. Indeed, this equivalence is stronger as far as 
negative consequences are taken into account, as we show below. 
Theorem 3. Let P be a program and p(i) be an atom. The following statements are 
equivalent :
(0 (P *, U&J b v,p(_t); 
(ii) (P*,U*)FvYp({); 
(iii) ( p (_t) has only jiniteb failed fair SLD derivations from P. 
PROOF. The equivalence of (ii) and (iii) summarizes oundness [l] and completeness 
12,141 of negation as failure. 
The equivalence between (i) and (iii) can easily be shown as follows. Let Ans be a 
propositional symbol not occurring in P, and P + the program obtained by adding 
the clause Ans :-p(t) to P. Then p(l) is finitely failed in P iff Ans E FF( P + ) iff 
[by Corollary l(ii)](P+*,U&-,)t==Ansiff (P+*,U&,)!=V-,p(_r). 0 
The above result is actually a stronger form of completeness for negation as 
failure, exploiting the equivalence between (P *, U *) and (P *, U&.,) with respect 
to the negative information. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that such an 
equivalence holds for formulae of the kind V,p(t) only. For instance, let P be 
p(s(x)):- 
PW- 
Then, Vxp(x) is a logical consequence of (P *, U&), but it is not a logical 
consequence of (P *, U * ). Nevertheless, the notion of (finite) coverings allows us to 
characterize precisely which formulae of the kind VP(~) are logical consequences of 
(P *, U&,) but are not logical consequences of (P *, U * )_ This is achieved by the 
next theorem. 
Theorem 4. Let P be a logic program and p ( f ) be a (possibly open) atom. Then 
(P*, U&,) I= VP(:) ifl there exists a finite covering {r;, . . . , f;} of _t such that 
(P*,U*)kVp(i;) foreachi=l,..., k. 
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PROOF. + : Straightforward, observing that (P *, U&J b VP($) for each i = 
1 , . . . , k, and thus Theorem 2 applies, yielding (P *, U&,) t= Vp( 0. 
4 : Suppose that for each finite covering { $, . . . , g;} of [ there exists i in 
1 ,...,ksuchthat(P*,U*)u3,p(tl)hasamodel.Thisisalsotrueforthefinite 
covering of _t given by { [ }. Moreover, by Corollary 1, for each ground instance A of 
p(t), (P *, U * ) I= A. The completeness property of SLD resolution guarantees that, 
for such an A, P(t) has a successful derivation with answer substitution (I such that 
A <p(t)a. Let {ui} be the set of all distinct computed substitutions. This set must 
be infinite, since otherwise the set { guj} would constitute a finite covering of _t. This 
implies that p(t) is the first goal of an infinite derivation sequence. Following the 
proof technique in Theorem 6 of [3] and recalling that U&,-unification is nothing 
but standard unification, such an infinite derivation sequence allows us to construct 
an extension of u&A, say U&, + , that is consistent. This is done by looking at the 
infinite collection of substitutions { Oi} in the derivation sequence as a collection of 
ground equations over a larger alphabet Z + obtained by replacing each distinct 
variable xi with a new constant symbol cj. That is, if the substitution Si contains the 
equations { xi = si( _x), . . . , xk = sk(x)}, the set Ei of ground equations { ci = 
sr(c), . *. 9 ck = sk(g)} is constructed, where ci,. . . , ck are new constant symbols. 
Then U,*,, + is obtained as U&, U { Ei >. It can be shown as in [3] that l_J&, U 
{Ei,*-*, E,} is a conservative xtension of U&* and thus it is consistent. Then, the 
compactness theorem allows us to state that also l&, + is consistent. Finally, the 
infinite derivation sequence can be looked upon as an infinite ground (P *, U&, + 
)-derivation sequence of a ground instance of p(l). Thus, such a ground in- 
stance js true in some U&, + models and false in others, since it belongs to 
GGF( P, U& + ) \ FF( P, U&, + ) [4]. This contradicts the hypothesis that 
(P *, Us*,,) g Vp( t), since U$*,, + models are of course U&, models. 0 
Intuitively, the previous result points out that the only logical consequences of 
complete programs of the form Vp(_t) induced by the domain closure axioms are 
those provable by case analysis (see Section 3). As a consequence a completeness 
result for SLD resolution with respect to (P *, U&,) can be stated. 
Corollary 2. Let P be a logic program, t < r’ terms, and p a predicate symbol such that 
(P *, U&,) I= Qp( 0. Then p(l’) has a finite set of successful SLD derivations with 
answer substitutions { q, . . . , uk } such that { f’q, . . . , !‘a, } is a jinite covering of _t. 
PROOF. Straightforward from Theorem 4 and completeness of SLD resolution with 
respect to (P*, U*). 0 
The above corollary can also be obtained as a consequence of Theorem 2 of [ll], 
considering -U&-A as the theory D axiomatizing the domain and the constraints as 
the equations corresponding to computed substitutions. 
It is worth noting that SLD resolution is complete with respect to (P *, U&J in 
a weaker sense than it is with respect o (P *, U * ). Nevertheless, Theorems 3 and 4 
together enable us to claim that complete logic programs with DCA are a stronger 
(and hence more informative) theoretical framework for logic programming with 
negation as failure than standard complete logic programs are. An outcome of our 
results is a deeper insight into some operational issues, which is the matter of the 
next section. 
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5. LIFI’ING PROPERTIES 
From the operational viewpoint, the main consequence of the results of the previous 
sections is a property for negation as failure, which is actually the dual property of 
the lifting lemma for successful SLD refutations. In fact, exploiting the proof-by- 
case-analysis rule and the notion of covering, the finite failure over a finite, 
exhaustive set of subcases is sufficient to guarantee the finite failure in the general 
case. 
Given a program P, we will write 
“p(t) fails ” as an abbreviation for “p(t) has only finitely failed (fair) deriva- 
tions”; 
“p(i) succeeds ” as an abbreviation for “p(t) has a successful (fair) derivation”; 
“p (t ) diverges ” as an abbreviation for “p (_t ) has no successful (fair) derivations 
and has at least one infinite derivation”. 
The following statement formalizes the lifting property mentioned above. 
Theorem 5. Let P be a program andp(t) be an atom. Let 5 be a finite covering oft, If 
p(_t’) fails for each f’ E E, then p(l) fails. 
PROOF. p(f’) fails for each l’ E 5 implies (by Theorem 3) 
(p*, %*,A> I=VlP(_r’) for each _t’ E 5, which implies (by Theorem 2) 
(p*1 Q,) I= V,P(!), 
which implies (by Theorem 3) 
p(g) fails. q 
Notice that the above property is false if one relaxes the condition on finiteness 
of the covering. For instance, let P (over BNat) be defined by the single clause 
PW)) :-P(x) 
Then p(s”(0)) fails for each n E w and {s”(O))},,, is a covering of the variable 
term x, but p(x) diverges. 
The following is a particular case of the above theorem when no function 
symbols are used in the program. 
Corollary 3. Let P be a program over Z prouiding no function symbol, andp(t) be an 
atom. Then p(s) fails for each s E ground(r) only if p( t) fails. 
PROOF. It is a consequence of Theorem 5, since ground(l) is a finite covering of t. 
0 
The following is a further, weaker lifting property of finite failure, which will be 
useful shortly. 
Corollary 4. Let P be a program and p( _t) be a nonground atom. For each _t’ x _t, p( _t’) 
fails only if p(l) fails. 
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PROOF. Pick up from the set of proper instances of _t a finite (exact) covering of l, 
and apply Theorem 5. 0 
The next two results exploit the lifting property of the finite failure to devise a 
converse property of divergence. 
Corollary 5. Let P be a program andp( t ) be a nonground atom. If p( t ) diverges, then 
there exists a proper instance t’ of _t such that p(t’) diverges. 
PROOF. Suppose that for each proper instance 8’ of 6 p(t’) does not diverge. The 
following two cases must be considered: 
(a) For some proper instance I’ of _t, p(_t’) succeeds. This gives a contradiction, 
since in this case p(t) succeeds too. 
(b) For each proper instance l’ of E, p(t’) fails. Then apply Corollary 4 to get a 
contradiction. 13 
Corollary 6. Let P be a deJinite program over Z providing no function symbol, and 
p(_t) be an atom. If p(t) diverges, then there exists a ground instance s of _t such 
that p(s) diverges. 
PROOF. Suppose that for each ground instance s of {, p(s) does not diverge. The 
following two cases must be considered: 
(a) For some ground instance 5 of t, p(s) succeeds. This gives a contradiction, 
since in this case p ( f ) succeeds too. 
(b) For each ground instance ; of t, p(s) fails. Then apply Corollary 3 to get a 
contradiction. 0 
REMARK (due to J.-L. Lassez). Corollaries 3 and 6 have been obtained using the 
notion of term covering. Following a different approach, they can be generalized by 
taking into account the notion of canonical programs, that is, programs such that 
FF( P) = GGF( P) [5]. More precisely, Corollary 3 can be generalized as follows: 
Let P be a program and p( f ) an atom such that P U {Ans :-p (t )} is canonical 
(where Ans is a new propositional constant). Then p(s) fails for each 5 E ground( {) 
only if p(t) fails. 
The result easily follows by noting that every infinite fair derivation for p(l) 
would be also an infinite derivation for Ans. Similar considerations apply to 
Corollary 6. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Complete logic programs augmented with the domain-closure axiom have been 
proposed, and related completeness results for logic programming with negation as 
failure have been proved. In [12] it is proved that U&, is a complete theory, 
provided that the alphabet contains at least two function symbols. Therefore, all 
these results imply that complete logic programs with DCA are not only a stronger 
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framework than ordinary complete logic programs, but indeed the strongest frame- 
work (embedding Clark’s equality axioms) within which completeness i  preserved. 
This should constitute a good motivation to take complete logic programs with 
DCA as the reference theory for logic programming with negation as failure. 
Moreover, the proof-by-case-analysis inference rule, induced by DCA, gave an 
opportunity to reach a deeper insight into the operational properties of SLD 
resolution. 
Herbrand models obviously satisfy DCA, but unfortunately it is not possible to 
achieve completeness for negation as failure by restricting attention to them. DCA 
brings one closer to Herbrand models than Clark’s equality theory alone does, still 
preserving completeness. Open issues are related to this latter remark: It would be 
nice to devise some notion of canoni& interpretation domain for UzcA, say D, such 
that models over D are enough to preserve completeness (of course, such a D has to 
properly include the Herbrand universe). Perhaps interesting links with this issue 
can be found in the area of recursive domain equation solving. 
Some proofs in the early version of this paper were long, tedious and, to a large extent, unnecessary. We 
are greatly indebted to Jean-Louis Lassez and Michael Maher, who gave us a lot of suggestions for 
simplifying the proofs and turning a collection of theorems into a paper. 
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